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RULES 
Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure 1 
iii 
I. SUMMARY 
The trial court abused its discretion by conducting the trial 
on the one day it was certain that Schwartz could not attend. 
Having been timely informed that Schwartz must be present on the 
primary election day for the Massachusetts legislature, the trial 
court refused to move the trial to a less inopportune time and 
denied Schwartz the ability to assist his counsel and testify in 
his own defense at the trial. 
The trial court also ignored the express terms of an unambig-
uous condition precedent. This error should be reviewed using a 
correction of error standard because the intent of the parties may 
be determined from the unambiguous words of the written agreement. 
A clearly erroneous standard of review is not appropriate because 
the trial court did not need to make findings of fact in order to 
determine the meaning of the condition precedent. No legal 
doctrine permits the trial court to ignore express written contract 
terms because one party claims they are not material. 
Finally, the trial court's error in reforming the contract 
without finding a mistake of fact cannot be justified as a means 
for the trial court to emphasize the term "sale". An interpreta-
tion that the "sale" referred to in the express condition precedent 
had occurred on May 2 0 would strip the condition of any meaning 
because the parties agreed to the condition more than a month later 
on June 2 5. 
S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim) " I " 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Conducting the Trial 
on the One Day it was Certain that Schwartz Could Not Attend. 
1- Schwartz's Attendance in Massachusetts was Required on 
the Election Day. 
The trial court conducted the trial on the election day that 
Schwartz was a candidate in a special primary for the Massachusetts 
Legislature. Even Fehlauer agreed and acknowledged that the trial 
setting on the election day was "inopportune." Record at 64. 
Fehlauer further suggested that the trial court could review the 
trial setting in light of the future results of Schwartz's 
candidacy in Massachusetts with the possibility that the trial 
could be held as late as July if Schwartz continued to win elec-
tions and indeed served as a representative in the Massachusetts 
Legislature. Record at 64. 
Fehlauer thus recognized the necessity of a political candi-
date to be present in the election jurisdiction for the final 
campaigning before an election, to vote in the election, and to be 
present for the results of the election. Schwartz's absence from 
Massachusetts on the election day would have been devastating to 
his campaign and would have breached the commitments he had made to 
his supporters. 
However, Fehlauer overstates the record of Schwartz's 
responses to alternative trial dates discussed in two unrecorded 
scheduling conferences held on March 28 and April 26, 1994. These 
conferences are described in a "Statement of Proceedings When No 
Report Was Made," pursuant to Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellant 
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Procedure. Record at 210-213. Addendum Tab 1. Nowhere does the 
record reflect that Schwartz stated he "would not set foot out of 
Massachusetts until after the election" nor did he "lodge a veto 
against the entire three-month period from March until July". 
Instead, the record reflects that Schwartz made the trial court 
aware of his candidacy and presented arguments and reasons why it 
would be difficult for him to attend until after this commitment 
was completed. Further, Schwartz's counsel did affirmatively 
commit the availability of her client after the possibility of his 
commitments were completed during July. Record at 231. 
2. The Trial Court had Other Options for a Trial Date. 
The trial court had multiple options available to it in 
choosing a trial date which would have been less prejudicial to 
Schwartz. The trial court could have followed the suggestion of 
Fehlauer and set a trial date which would have allowed Schwartz to 
fulfill his commitments subject to his continuing to win elections 
and serve in the Massachusetts Legislature. For example, the trial 
court could have set a trial date subsequent to the special primary 
election on May 10 and if Schwartz won that election, which he did, 
then the trial court could continue the trial until after the 
general election. If Schwartz won in the general election, then 
the trial court could have set a trial date after the completion of 
the legislative session in July. Rather than following this 
procedure, the trial court conducted the trial on the one day it 
was certain that Schwartz could not attend. 
S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim) - 3 -
Schwartz presented good reasons why the trial dates considered 
were not appropriate. However, none of these dates would have 
absolutely prevented the attendance of Schwartz as did the May 10 
date. 
At the scheduling conference held on Monday, March 28, 1994 
the court suggested the trial could be held seven days later on the 
following Monday, April 4, 1994. Record at 211. Addendum Tab 1. 
This date presented the obvious problem of a short notice to 
prepare for trial, particularly for an out of state defendant who 
must make travel arrangements. It was also in the middle of 
Schwartz's campaign. His counsel justifiably did not voluntarily 
accept this date. Similarly, the date of May 12 presented 
additional problems because of Schwartz's possible continuing 
campaign in Massachusetts and the prior commitment of his counsel 
to attend a Mandatory Continuing Legal Education event. 
At the scheduling conference conducted on April 26, 1994, the 
trial court had before it the knowledge that Schwartz's primary 
election was the same day as the date set for trial on May 10, 
1994. The court also had Schwartz's motion to continue the trial 
and Fehlauer's acknowledgement that the existing date of May 10, 
1994 was "inopportune". Record at 64. The trial court considered 
other possible dates, all of which presented problems, but none of 
which absolutely prevented Schwartz's attendance as did the May 10 
date. 
Schwartz argued why each of the proposed dates were inconven-
ient and prejudicial. Nevertheless, rather than choosing any of 
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these dates the trial court instead chose the one date which 
Schwartz absolutely could not attend. 
3. The Trial Court had the Responsibility to Set a Trial 
Date that Schwartz Could Attend. 
In setting a trial date, the parties must argue why proposed 
dates may not be reasonable in light of the circumstances. While 
an agreed trial date may be the preferred method, the trial court 
still has the responsibility to set a reasonable date when the 
parties cannot agree. 
The trial court in this case was not able to obtain a 
voluntary agreement between Fehlauer and Schwartz, except for a 
date after Schwartz completed his civic commitment to the Massa-
chusetts Legislature. Nevertheless, the trial court remained 
obligated to set a trial date which was reasonable in the 
circumstances. A date in the latter part of July would have 
satisfied Schwartz's concerns and only marginally disadvantaged 
Fehlauer's desire to begin immediate construction in the event 
Fehlauer prevailed. From all the dates discussed in the two 
scheduling conferences, the trial court chose, and then refused to 
continue, the one date that all parties knew Schwartz could not 
attend. Even Fehlauer agreed that this date was "inopportune." 
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the 
trial from this date. 
In his opposition brief, Fehlauer relies on cases which 
discuss the trial court's discretion to continue trials for the 
purpose of accommodating witnesses. None of these cases address 
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the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in not 
granting a continuance to allow a party to attend his own trial. 
See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State 
v. Oliver, 820 P. 2d 474, 476-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) . In the cited 
type of case, the issue often becomes whether alternative means can 
be used to produce evidence or whether the offered evidence would 
materially prejudice the party if not presented at trial. The 
situation presented when a party is denied the opportunity to 
attend his own trial is quite different. The absence of a party at 
his own trial to testify in his own defense and assist his counsel 
far overshadows the absence of a piece of evidence or of a 
potential witness. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 
2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378 (1962), a party has a significant right 
to participate in the defense of an action pending against him. 
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it insisted that 
the trial proceed on the one day all parties agreed would preclude 
the participation of Schwartz. 
B. The Trial Court Interpreted an Unambiguous Condition Precedent 
so as to Ignore its Express Terms. 
1• All Terms and Conditions of an Unambiguous Contract Must 
be Given Effect. 
Fehlauer's complaint presented the trial court with the en-
forcement of the following express written condition precedent: 
Subject to sale of house & property at 841 S.W. Hoyts-
ville Road, Coalville on or before July 6, 1993. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has long held that if a contract is in 
writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the 
parties must be determined from the words of the agreement. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) citing 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat7!. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
A court may only consider extrinsic evidence, if after careful 
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain. A 
contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, 
missing terms, or facial deficiencies". Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 
665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
The condition quoted above is not ambiguous because it is not 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. None of the 
terms have uncertain meanings, no terms are missing and no facial 
deficiencies exist. The parties have specifically identified the 
property that must be sold by address and specifically stated the 
date by which it must be sold.1 
Furthermore, the trial court made no conclusion that the 
condition contained any ambiguity or uncertainty. Even if the 
trial court had made such a conclusion, it would have been an error 
lrThe interpretation that Fehlauer argues for the first time in 
his Appellee's Brief, concerning the meaning of the term "sale", is 
addressed more fully in Section I.e. of this Reply Brief. No 
uncertainty could have existed as to whether the term "sale" meant 
"entry into a contract" or "final closing" because by the time 
Schwartz entered the contract with Fehlauer on June 25, the con-
tract of sale with the Madsen's had been entered more than a month 
earlier on May 20. To interpret the term "sale" as meaning May 20, 
the date of the contract with Madsen, would strip the condition 
precedent of any meaning whatsoever because the "sale" would have 
already occurred by the time Fehlauer agreed to the condition on 
June 2 5. 
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of law, and may have been reviewed on appeal for correction of 
error. Id. at 1293. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 
P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
The trial court interpreted an unambiguous contract and the 
Court of Appeals may review such conclusions for correctness with 
no particular deference given to the trial court's ruling. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 
198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). The clearly erroneous standard of review 
is not appropriate because extrinsic evidence is not required to 
determine the parties' intent. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a 
court must determine the parties' intent from the document itself, 
giving effect to all terms of the contract. 
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that the 
intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the 
content of the instrument itself. . . . Each contract 
provision is to be considered in relation to all of the 
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none. 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 8 02 
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) quoting Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 
P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981) . See also LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life 
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) . (Contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its 
terms.) The court must apply a plain meaning rule which preserves 
the intent of the parties and protects the contract against 
judicial revision. See, Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 
657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). 
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The trial court, in stating its three alternative grounds for 
excusing the express condition precedent either ignores the plain 
meaning of the written word or expressly revises the words so as to 
excuse the July 6 deadline by which the adjacent Madsen property 
must have been sold. Under well recognized principles of contract 
interpretation, the trial court was required to give effect to all 
terms of the condition and had no authority to ignore or revise 
them. 
2. The Trial Court Cannot Ignore Contract Terms Which One 
Party Claims are not Material. 
The trial court concluded in Conclusions of Law No. 1 and 2 
that it could consider extrinsic or parole evidence in analyzing 
the materiality of a contract term especially in a specific 
performance case. Record at 171-72. However, Fehlauer has cited 
no authority for this legal conclusion. Indeed, if such authority 
existed, it would run counter to the established rules of contract 
interpretation and permit virtually every contract term to be 
challenged because one party did not consider the term to be 
material. 
The trial court may have confused the concept of strict com-
pliance with a condition precedent and the concept of substantial 
compliance with a contract covenant. The case of Brown-Marx 
Associates, Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 
1983) illustrates this distinction. A prospective borrower had 
sued a bank alleging breach of a contract to close a loan 
commitment. The bank defended on the grounds that the commitment 
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was conditioned upon the borrower obtaining leases of not less than 
$714,447.00 per annum. The borrower only obtained leases in the 
amount of $706,186.00. Id. at 1366, Fn.4. The borrower argued 
that he had substantially complied with the condition. The court 
noted: 
The substantial performance doctrine provides that where 
a contract is made for an agreed exchange of two 
performances, one of which is to be rendered first, 
substantial performance rather than exact, strict or 
literal performance by the first party of the terms of 
the contract is adequate to entitle the party to recover 
on it. . . . 
The doctrine is not primarily concerned with substantial 
performance of a "condition" but rather with substantial 
performance by one party of his obligations arising out 
of the agreed exchange under the contract. 
Id. at 1367. 
The court then held that the substantial performance doctrine had 
no application to the minimum annual rent requirement imposed by 
the express condition precedent in the commitment. Since the 
condition had not been satisfied, the court could not enforce the 
commitment. 
Even if the trial court had properly considered evidence of 
whether the July 6 provision in the express condition precedent was 
material, the evidence that Schwartz attached no particular 
significance to the date does not mean that the parties intended no 
date to apply. The undisputed facts established that Schwartz 
proposed the specific date of July 6 and Fehlauer accepted it. 
Record at 319. The parties established a certain date beyond which 
Schwartz would be free of his obligation to sell the property. A 
specific choice of dates between July 1, July 6 or July 10 may not 
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have been significant, but a definite date was important. Having 
chosen the date, and the condition having failed to occur prior to 
the date, Schwartz was entitled to the benefit of his bargain and 
to be relieved from the obligation to convey the property to 
Fehlauer. 
The trial court improperly concluded that it could analyze the 
materiality of a contract term with extrinsic and parol evidence. 
No legal principle allows the court to ignore a contract term 
because one party may not consider it material. All terms must be 
given effect and an express condition precedent must be satisfied 
by strict performance. 
3. An Express Condition Precedent does not Require a "Time 
is of the Essence" Provision in Order for a Deadline to 
be Enforced. 
Because an express condition precedent containing a deadline 
expressly avoids a contract if the stated event does not occur 
before the dated stated, a separate term stating that "time is of 
the essence" is not necessary. Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp., 
600 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1991); Barnes v. Euster, 214 A.2d 807, 809 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1965); Clarke v. Lacy, 132 A.2d 478, 483 (Md. Ct. App. 
1957). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this principle in 
Braithwaite v. Sorensen, 561 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1977). As described 
in Schwartz's opening brief, the parties in Braithwaite had made 
performance of a real estate purchase contract dependent upon the 
release of a federal tax lien within three years. The Utah Supreme 
Court noted: 
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Under the express terms of the contract, a condition 
precedent to performance was a release of the tax lien. 
If this contingency did not occur in three years, the 
escrow agent would redeliver the money and papers, and 
the parties would be released of all obligations under 
the contract. 
Id. at 1084. 
The Braithwaite Court held that the obligations were extinguished 
after the deadline expired even though the buyers had provided a 
mechanism for releasing the lien. The Court thus recognized the 
significance of a time deadline stated in an express condition. 
Some courts have compared a condition with a deadline to an 
option. Options are considered and construed as unilateral 
contracts, requiring full performance by one party before an 
obligation to perform arises. In such cases "time is of the 
essence is a matter of law." Clarke v. Lacy, 132 A.2d 478, 483 
(Md. Ct. App. 1957). An option deadline would be of little value 
if it could be exercised at any reasonable time. 
The decision in Barker v. Francis, 741 P. 2d 548, 552 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) is entirely consistent with the common law rules stated 
above. The Utah Court of Appeals did not enforce a stated closing 
date because the contract did not include a "time is of the 
essence" provision. However, the Barker court was not considering 
a condition with a deadline. Rather, it was considering a covenant 
to close by a certain date. Covenants may require an express "time 
is of the essence" provision; conditions do not. 
Similarly, Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977) and 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate and Inv. , Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 
52 (Utah 1982) both involved issues of whether a party had timely 
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performed covenants in contracts which did not contain declarations 
that "time is of the essence". Neither of these cases involved the 
issue of whether a condition had been satisfied. 560 P.2d at 1126 
("the agreement did not provide for any forfeiture or avoidance of 
the contract if the closing did not occur on the stated date") ; 645 
P.2d at 55 ("where the executory contract contains no declaration 
that time is of the essence, the contract obligations can continue 
for some time beyond the agreed closing date"). 
The court in Renovest noted that conditions must be treated 
differently from covenants. The parties' expectation of strict 
compliance with the condition should be given effect. 
[W]hen the parties expressly condition their performance 
upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event, rather 
than simply including the event as one of the general 
terms of the contract, the parties' bargained-for 
expectation of strict compliance should be given effect. 
600 A.2d at 452-53 (emphasis added). 
The two cases cited by Fehlauer as supporting the trial 
court's conclusions involve different issues which are not relevant 
to deciding this case. In Honevman v. Clostermann, 753 P.2d 1384 
(Or. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Baugh v. Bryant 
Ltd. Partnerships I Through XV, 803 P.2d 742 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), 
the trial court was presented with an ambiguous earnest money 
agreement. The agreement contained a closing date in the "time is 
of the essence" clause which directly conflicted with a "special 
condition" that the sale close within five days of satisfaction of 
a buildability contingency. These provisions presented a conflict 
as to when the buyer was obligated to close. The court resolved 
the conflict by interpreting the contract so that the closing date 
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in the "time is of the essence" clause was a "target date only" and 
that the closing date after satisfaction of the buildability 
condition was the closing date intended by the partiesl. JEd. at 
1387. 
These issues are substantially different from those presented 
by Fehlauer to the trial court. The express condition precedent 
that the adjoining property be sold by July 6 had occurred 
substantially before the date Fehlauer was required to close on 
August 13, 1993. No question of ambiguity existed as to the date 
by which the condition precedent must have occurred or the date 
that Fehlauer was obligated to close. 
In Walker v. Feiring, 632 P.2d 1270 (Or. Ct. App.' 1981) the 
court considered a situation where a single seller had agreed to 
sell five lots to a buyer for use in a single multi-family complex. 
The transaction was arranged so that two of the lots would be sold 
through two different intermediate buyers and then resold to the 
same ultimate buyer as the other three parcels in the same closing. 
A dispute developed in the course of closing which prevented the 
closing from occurring on the date specified. The seller took the 
position that he was relieved from his obligation tp sell but 
agreed to allow the sale of the two lots to the intermediate buyers 
and then to the ultimate buyer. 
The court in considering this situation relied upon the 
principle that a time limit in a contract may be waived by the 
parties. Id. at 1272. The court found that the seller's 
toleration of the buyer's late performance of two contracts in a 
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"package of contracts" should be considered a waiver of the buyer's 
timely performance with respect to the entire package. Id. 
The Walker case presents a substantially different situation 
than Fehlauer presented to the trial court. The trial court never 
considered a claim of waiver and never made findings of fact or 
conclusions of law as to whether Schwartz had waived the express 
condition precedent. Further, Schwartz's sale of the three parcels 
and the contract with Fehlauer was not a "package." In Walker, the 
contracts were made with the same ultimate buyers, at the same 
time, provided for the same closing date, and required closing 
through the same agent. 632 P. 2d 1271. Schwartz made his contract 
with the Madsen's a full month before the Fehlauer contract and 
required separate closing dates more than a month apart. The 
contracts were made with two separate buyers who had no intention 
of using the properties as a joint development. Indeed, both 
intended to use the properties for separate and distinct 
residences. Further, the inclusion of the express condition in the 
Fehlauer contract evidenced the separate treatment the parties 
intended for the Madsen and Fehlauer transactions. These 
circumstances do not present evidence sufficient to substantiate a 
waiver by Schwartz of the condition precedent. 
C. Fehlauer's Interpretation that the Sale Occurred on May 30 
Gives no Effect to the Condition Precedent Requiring the Sale 
Before July 6. 
Even though Fehlauer specifically attempted to amend his 
complaint seven days before trial to include a cause of action for 
reformation and even though the trial court made a specific decree 
S\SCHWARTZ\SCHWARTZ B02 (aim) ~ 1 5 ~ 
in the judgment that the condition precedent should be reformed 
(Record at 173) and supported that decree with a conclusion of law 
(Record at 171), Fehlauer now attempts to explain the conclusion of 
law as a way for the trial court to emphasize the term "sale" in 
the condition precedent. Fehlauer argues that the date of the 
Madsen contract, May 20, was the date of the "sale" referred to in 
the express condition precedent of the Fehlauer contract. This 
interpretation is not supported by the facts and would result in 
making the condition precedent meaningless. 
At trial, Fehlauer did not contend that the term "sale" in the 
condition precedent had any meaning other than a closing of the 
Madsen contract. The closing required a conveyance of the property 
by Schwartz to Madsen and payment of the purchase price by Madsen 
to Schwartz. Indeed, the Findings of Fact assumed that the sale 
did not occur until Madsen had paid the purchase price and Schwartz 
had conveyed the property. Findings of Fact 10 and 16. Record at 
165-66. 
Schwartz and Fehlauer entered their contract on June 25, 1993 
more than a month after the date of the Madsen contract on May 20, 
1993. Yet, Schwartz and Fehlauer expressly conditioned the 
Fehlauer contract on the sale of the Madsen property. If the 
parties intended the "sale" of the Madsen property to have occurred 
on May 20, 1993, then no reason existed for the parties to include 
the express condition precedent in the Fehlauer contract. The 
condition would have already been satisfied at the time they 
entered the Fehlauer contract on June 25, 1993. 
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Under fundamental rules of contract interpretation, "each 
contract provision is to be considered in relation to all others 
with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Utah 
Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981). The 
interpretation now advocated by Fehlauer would render the express 
condition meaningless. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter judgment in favor of Schwartz because, even taking 
the evidence presented solely by Fehlauer at trial, the express 
condition precedent to Schwartz's obligations was not satisfied or 
excused. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals should remand the 
case to the trial court for a new trial at a time that Schwartz may 
attend, testify on his own behalf and assist his counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o day of February, 1995. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Robert G. Holt 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing 
instrument were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^ 
day of February, 1995, to the following: 
H. James Clegg 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C. STEVEN FEHLAUER, 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, WHEN NO REPORT WAS MADE 
v. Civil No. 930312024 CN 
THOMAS H. SCHWARTZ, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following statement 
of proceedings shall be included by the Clerk of the Court in the record on appeal: 
A. Statement of Proceedings at Scheduling Conference held March 28. 1994. 
The Court conducted a scheduling conference by telephone on March 28, 1994. 
Present on the telephone conference call were H. James Clegg, counsel for plaintiff, and 
Janet A. Goldstein, counsel for defendant. 
3C:::RR^3: 470 
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The following are counsel's recollections of relevant events concerning the 
scheduling of this cause for trial. Where counsel's recollections differ, they are set forth 
in bold type. 
Based on the recollection of counsel, supported by affidavits, the following 
proceedings occurred: 
Mr. Schwartz's legislative candidacy was discussed. Ms. Goldstein stated that 
defendant, Mr. Schwartz, was running for the Massachusetts State Legislature and that he 
could not leave Massachusetts until after the election, which would be held in June. She 
advised that Mr. Schwartz would be able to try the case in Utah in July, 1994. The 
primary election date of May 10, 1994 was not mentioned. 
Mr. Clegg recalls Ms. Goldstein stating that Mr. Schwartz would be free in 
mid-June but Ms. Goldstein had a trial scheduled then that would take her into July. 
Mr. Clegg objected that the plaintiff, Dr. Fehlauer, would lose the entire 
construction year. 
Mr. Clegg recalls that the Court said a trial scheduled for the week of April 4, 
1994 would not occur and this time would be available; a setting during the week of 
April 4, 1994 was acceptable to plaintiff, but not to defendant. 
The Court suggested the week of May 9, 1994 for trial. Ms. Goldstein stated that 
her client, Mr. Schwartz, would be unavailable on those dates because of his campaign. 
She had particular objection to May 12 as she had scheduled an MCLE on insurance for 
that day. 
The Court concluded the scheduling conference by setting the trial date for May 10 
and 11, 1994. 
B. Statement of Proceedings at Pretrial Scheduling Conference Held on April 26. 1994 
The Court conducted a pretrial scheduling conference at the Summit County 
Courthouse in Coalville, Utah, on April 26, 1994. Present were H. James Clegg for 
plaintiff and Janet A. Goldstein for defendant. 
Based on the recollection of counsel the following proceedings occurred: 
Mr. Clegg recalls the Court suggesting all available dates in either Coalville or 
Salt Lake City to and including June 28, for trial. The Court suggested June 28, 
1994, even though it would be inconvenient for the Court and Mr. Clegg because of 
their required attendance at Judicial Council and Bar Commission meetings at Sun 
Valley on June 29, 1994. 
Ms. Goldstein stated that a letter from the town clerk of Douglas, Massachusetts, 
stated that her client, Mr. Schwartz, would be required to attend legislative sessions during 
that time if he won the May 10 and June 11 elections. Ms. Goldstein stated that, in the 
event Mr. Schwartz lost either of the elections, June 28 would be an acceptable date but 
that, until the elections were held, it was not possible to commit to a date certain. 
After further discussing the May 10 primary, the Court suggested Mr. Schwartz 
could participate in the primary on Tuesday, May 10, 1994, and travel to Coalville to 
prepare with his counsel, Ms. Goldstein, on May 11, 1994, and the morning of May 12, 
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1994, so that the trial could begin at 1:30 p.m. on May 12, 1994. Ms. Goldstein believed 
such a schedule would be unrealistic. 
Ms. Goldstein advised the Court that her client, Mr. Schwartz, could not be 
available on May 13 because it was right after his primary election and fewer than three 
weeks before the special election. Ms. Goldstein told the Court that she would need at 
least two full days with her client, Mr. Schwartz, to prepare for trial and that she had 
previously committed to attending a continuing legal education seminar on May 12. 
The Court concluded that the trial would be held as scheduled on May 10-11, 1994. 
DATED this /(/ day of August, 1994. 
$ * % ^ 
• l! 
# > COUNTY / c 
' " ' M i l l i n g 
Approved: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
norable David 5. Young 
District Court Judge 
H/Jamds Clegg 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Robert G. Holt 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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